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## **Culturalization of citizenship in the Netherlands**

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Western European countries are heatedly debating how much and what kind of cultural differentiation is to be allowed in the public domain. Many have witnessed the rise of right-wing populist parties that see migrants as a threat to social cohesion and national identity.<sup>1</sup> The culture debate rages on a wide scale.<sup>2</sup> Much of this debate has a nostalgic character, based on a reifying, ahistorical notion of culture. Culture is portrayed as a closed, timeless, and conflict-free whole, carried by citizens who all basically share the same beliefs, norms, and traditions. On the basis of this closed conception of culture, the debate focuses on actual or potential harming influences on society of Muslim minorities, who form the majority of the migrant population in western Europe.

Many native Europeans, who increasingly tend to fear Islam, embrace this restorative conception of culture.<sup>3</sup> The building of mosques, the call to prayer, the use of religious symbols such as the headscarf, gender inequality, anti-integration pronouncements by ultra-orthodox imams, and Islam-inspired political extremism as threatening to Dutch culture are all popular media subjects.<sup>4</sup> In the Netherlands, the Islamophobic List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) party took second place in the 2002 elections, after its leader had been murdered. "These

events did not fit the Netherlands's global image . . . as a wealthy, tolerant, and perhaps excessively liberal society.”<sup>5</sup>

In the following, we examine the retreat from multiculturalism in the Netherlands, one of its supposed standard-bearers in Europe, the subsequent culturalization of citizenship, and their consequences for the relations between native-born Dutch and Muslim migrants.

### **A Multicultural Paradise?**

What happened in the Netherlands, often jealously described as an oasis of tolerance?

According to Christian Joppke, the whole approach of allowing designated minority groups to emancipate themselves within their own parallel institutions allegedly fueled segregation and separation from mainstream society.<sup>6</sup> Other scholars also claim that Dutch multiculturalist integration policy had pernicious effects on the cultural (and economic) integration of migrants.<sup>7</sup> As Paul Sniderman and Louk Hagendoorn write: “In the Netherlands, as much as can be done on behalf of multiculturalism has been done. . . . It promoted the most ambitious program of multiculturalism in Western Europe. . . . The politics of the Netherlands since the assassination of Pim Fortuyn has been the politics of multiculturalism in extremis.”<sup>8</sup> In their view, this radical multiculturalism caused enormous tensions in the Netherlands: “The whole thrust of multiculturalism is to accentuate, even exaggerate, differences between majority and minority and insist on their importance. . . . Sharing a common identity builds support for inclusion; bringing differences of ethnic and religious identity to the fore evokes the very exclusionary reactions it is meant to avoid.”<sup>9</sup>

Are or were the Dutch indeed radical multiculturalists, supporting multicultural policies? As we have proven elsewhere,<sup>10</sup> this is a huge misunderstanding of what really happened and happens in the Netherlands. Policies that focused on the sociocultural position of immigrants were characterized by far more variety than Sniderman and Hagendoorn

suggest. The policy regarding cultural identities in the 1970s can easily be misunderstood as multiculturalist, the central tenet being “guest workers” should maintain their identity. The reason for this policy, however, was not to accommodate pluralism in the Netherlands. It was to facilitate migrants’ eventual return home, i.e. to their country of origin. In the early 1980s, the ideal of group empowerment was primarily considered a tool for emancipation, building strongly on the legacy of pillarization that characterized Dutch social structure well into the 1960s. This policy emphasis faded into the background by the late 1980s, as the objective of fully individual socioeconomic integration and participation gradually took center stage.

As a result, central government policy toward sociocultural integration manifested little consistency. It evolved from focusing on achieving group emancipation to an approach that accentuated individual integration. More recently, policy has insisted that migrants adjust to Dutch culture, to Dutch norms and values, in order to avert the impending danger of insufficient social cohesion.<sup>11</sup>

While Ruud Koopmans, Paul Statham, Marco Giugni and Florence Passy like Sniderman and Hagendoorn, label the Dutch situation as culturally pluralist, or even as being increasingly pluralist, this seems to exaggerate what government policies were actually promoting.<sup>12</sup> As Koopmans and his colleagues acknowledge, tolerance for the religious practices of immigrants had little to do with national integration policies, let alone radical multiculturalism. They observe: “To an important extent, the extension of multicultural rights to minorities in the Netherlands is based on the heritage of pillarization . . . and was meant to accommodate cultural conflicts between native religious groups. Muslims and other minorities have made use of this available institutional framework.”<sup>13</sup>

Thus, the use of some group-specific provisions by migrants was made possible by the general Dutch institutional framework. To the degree that this provided a basis for creating migrant religious and cultural institutions, it had nothing whatsoever to do with

pluralist integration policies.<sup>14</sup> Instead of favoring the development of a new (Islamic) religious pillar, most politicians were decidedly reluctant to support such a development. One of the most secularized countries in the world, the Netherlands showed little inclination to accommodate new religious institutions. In fact, from the 1970s onward, local governments tried to prohibit migrants from claiming their rights as Dutch citizens to set up Muslim schools.<sup>15</sup>

This leaves us with a puzzle: if it is not a multicultural model that fuels the recent political and social polarization in the Netherlands, what then? We argue that a restorative culturalization of citizenship has come to dominate the Dutch debate on integration. As a result, the Dutch liberal culture is more and more depicted as a product of timeless consensus. To be prevented from harm by external influences, this culture has to be protected and restored, and migrants have to prove feelings of loyalty to it. The only way to understand the polarization surrounding integration is to take processes of culturalization into account.

### **The Dutch Cultural Consensus**

Contrary to the dominant image of the Netherlands, this cultural confrontation does not feed on actual multiculturalism. As argued, the Netherlands has never had a full-fledged multiculturalist government actively promoting pluralist religious and cultural identities, as current popular wisdom holds it to be doing. The tradition of pillarization gave some leeway for Islamic institutions, but integration policies never straightforwardly promoted immigrant religious identities.

Moreover, the majority population of the Netherlands has rapidly become more culturally homogeneous. Whereas in many countries, including the United States, the majority opinion is divided on issues of gender, family, and sexuality, almost the entire political spectrum of the Dutch majority population supports progressive values on these

matters. After a period of intense cultural polarization during the “long sixties,” the majority has developed remarkably uniform, progressive ideals according to the Euro-barometer, European Social Survey, European Values Study, International Social Survey Program, and the Continuous Tracking Survey, as recapitulated in various studies.<sup>16</sup>

More than anywhere else in Europe, the Dutch majority population believes that divorce is acceptable and homosexuality nothing out of the ordinary. More than other Europeans, the Dutch disagree with conservative propositions that “women have to have children to be happy,” that “a child should respect its parents,” or that “we would be better off were we to return to a traditional way of life.” Finally, the Netherlands show less of a value gap on these questions between more and less highly educated people and are now among the three least culturally polarized of the European countries.<sup>17</sup> The Dutch majority tends to demand that migrants share these values. This reflects in part the strength of the consensus within the majority population. In this respect, the Netherlands is similar to Denmark, which also has a clearly enlightened moral majority.

This progressive consensus evidently requires policy to enforce the acculturation of those who are assumed to fall outside of it. It may come as a surprise that a progressive and tolerant country demands conformity from those whose views are not progressive. When it comes down to such values, a liberal country evidently need not esteem diversity.<sup>18</sup> Distinct groupings, such as a denominational school, an ethnic sports club, or a migrant student association, are often depicted as akin to apartheid. The cultural consensus among the Dutch goes hand in hand with a consensual dismissal of other sets of values. As Ian Buruma has observed: “Tolerance, then, has its limits even for Dutch progressives. It is easy to be tolerant of those who are much like us. . . . It is much harder to extend the same principle to the strangers in our midst, who find our ways as disturbing as we do theirs.”<sup>19</sup>

Pillarization may once have accommodated pluralism. Today, pluralism is far away, as the growing consensus around progressive values has created a bigger value gap between the native majority and Muslim migrants than in countries with less progressive majority cultures. As Van der Veer puts it: “For the Dutch, Muslims stand for theft of enjoyment. Their strict sexual morals remind the Dutch too much of what they have so recently left behind. . . . In a society where consumption and especially the public performance of sexual identity have become so important, the strict clothing habits of observant Muslims are an eyesore.”<sup>20</sup>

This progressive monoculture of the Dutch majority has an ambiguous effect on integration opportunities for minorities. On the one hand, some migrants have come to share this progressive culture more than anywhere else. Survey results show increasing support for so-called Western values among Dutch migrants and their offspring.<sup>21</sup> This progressive cultural consensus also proved to be a fruitful opportunity structure for ex-Muslims to protest against sexism, homophobia, and lack of freedom of speech among Muslim’s texts or traditions, such as the famous politician Hirsi Ali, who fervently objected to sexism in the Koran, the Foundation Youssef for gay and lesbian Muslims, and the short-lived association of ex-Muslims with the local politician Ehsan Jami.<sup>22</sup>

On the other hand, the value gap between Muslim groups and the majority population is larger than in other countries. The majority-immigrant distance in value orientations is greater in the Netherlands than in Germany on such dimensions as community spirit, (equality in) gender roles, and sexuality.<sup>23</sup> All in all, it is unambiguous that the majority population of the Netherlands has come to define cultural differences as a growing problem.

### **Culturalization**

The above-sketched polarization requires an understanding of the culturalization of citizenship, of the process by which culture (emotions, feelings, cultural norms and values, and cultural symbols and traditions, including religion) has come to play a central role in the debate on social integration. Dismissing this culturalization as irrelevant or as an unnecessary threat to integration—ritual among left-of-center politicians and thinkers—ignores that culture in this broad sense plays a substantial role in determining individual life chances. Citizenship as a mere socioeconomic mechanism to organize fair and equal membership of society has lost its self-evidence. On the individual level, knowing and, to a certain degree, adapting to norms such as when to shake hands, how to apply rules of honesty and secrecy, when to look people in the face, are helpful to finding and keeping a job, to say the least.<sup>24</sup> On the collective level, the intensity of the culture debate under conditions of relative economic prosperity underlines not necessarily the legitimacy of this cultural argument, but it does suggest that the cultural including and excluding mechanism might have become much stronger.

Culturalization of citizenship can be found in the utterances of both politicians and academics.<sup>25</sup> With the term “culturalization of citizenship” we mean to describe a process in which more meaning is attached to cultural participation (in terms of norms, values, practices, and traditions), either as an alternative or in addition to citizenship as rights and socioeconomic participation.

We discern four forms of culturalization along two axes: functional versus emotional, and restorative versus constructivist culturalization. Functional culturalization points to participation in cultural practices such as speaking Dutch in public or at home, following citizenship courses, and having knowledge of the history and traditions. Emotive culturalization concerns issues such as how, where, with whom, and under which circumstances citizens feel at home, feel they belong, feel respected, and feel there is room

for them. These “feeling rules”<sup>26</sup> have to do with (lack of) feelings of belonging and loyalty that are the product of integration and immigration—they apply both for immigrants and for the native population. As feelings as such cannot be easily witnessed in strangers, some actions can be taken as symbols of such feelings; in the Netherlands, a double passport is such a symbol (that is, of lack of loyalty to the Dutch culture).

Restorative versus constructivist concerns the issue whether culture is treated as set and fixed or as dynamic and in the making. The restorative idea of culture is that as culture is already given, it is either familiar or should otherwise be (re)discovered, for example, by looking for a canon and decisive moments in history. The constructivist idea of culture is that culture is a process in the making by those involved. On the one hand, this process builds on traditions; on the other hand, it incorporates changes produced by cultural mixing. This leads to the ideal-type matrix shown in table 13.1.

**<Insert Table 13.1 about here>**

The restorative culturalization centers around the ambition to reestablish national culture and identity through rather thick notions of citizenship. Entrance into the polity here is a duty every individual has to fulfill, and the conditions are quite clear. The restorative culturalization of citizenship is more or less shared by groups of orthodox Muslims, who have the same idea of their culture as a unified and conflict-free whole which can only be negatively affected by external influences.<sup>27</sup>

Not surprisingly, inspired by these restorative views interethnic clashes are on the increase.<sup>28</sup> Monolithic conceptions of culture fuel the polarization that may cause political radicalization among Muslims and native-born Dutch. Some Muslim migrants and autochthonous youth might feel so excluded that they choose to opt out rather than speak up in case of contestation, creating a new, homogeneous transnational culture of their own rather



than either reproducing their parents' background or somehow mastering the culture of the country in which they are born.<sup>29</sup> This invites threats to democracy by violent extremists.

A functional restorative culturalization of citizenship is built on the idea that citizens have to adapt to certain core values and preferably confess their engagement to these ideals. Democratic citizenship has to be understood and taught--for instance, in the form of a national historical canon in school curricula. This type of culturalization stresses the nation, resemblance, and shared values between citizens rather than the city or the neighborhood, reciprocity, and practical cooperation on matters of common interest as entries to a shared identity. From this perspective, institutions and norms are considered more or less given. Hence, the protection or reconstruction of the interethnic relations in the public sphere requires a stress on individual civic duties.<sup>30</sup>

An emotive restorative culturalization stresses the need for feelings of loyalty to the national state, and demands feelings of loyalty and belonging from immigrants and proof of such feelings. It includes, for example, the sometimes expressed warning that migrants who do not manage to feel at home better should go "home," that is, disappear altogether—even when they are born and raised in the Netherlands.<sup>31</sup>

Most of the elements that ignite the ongoing and heated debate in the Netherlands—but also, for instance, in Denmark—can be traced back to this restorative approach, particularly the emotive variant. It can be found both on the Left and the Right. Both might claim that native-born Dutch do not feel at home anymore, because they cannot imagine sharing their home with people so alien to their norms and values. Or as a prominent left-wing member of the Dutch government put it recently:

<EXT>Take homosexuals and women, who thought they had achieved equal rights but now have to defend their rights and freedoms all over again, with the arrival of new communities with different values. Or take the ordinary, law-abiding citizen

faced with the arrival of terrorism from other countries and cultures, who wonders why terrorists call themselves true Muslims and what this says about the next-door neighbor, who happens to be a Muslim too.<sup>32</sup>

However, a more constructivist culturalization can also be found. Culture here is not something that can be uncovered and conserved, and to which newcomers can only adapt, as in the restorative version. Rather, culture here is a dynamic concept, and even though a culture has traditions and a history, it is changing, and its content is contested by various groups. Culture is something that is made rather than found, by democratic processes as well as in everyday exchanges between citizens. The constructivist approach to culturalization concentrates on rethinking existing practices in light of their binding and dividing consequences. It shares with restorative culturalization the idea that cultural clashes should not be brushed aside; but instead of looking for historically prescribed solutions, the outcome of these clashes is considered unsure. Everyday life politics, political literacy, and the learning of citizenship are all part of the ongoing process of culturalization.

Emotive constructivist culturalization looks at experiences and feelings of citizens and the degree to which these are shared, and to what degree this sharing culminates in participation in institutions. This approach entails questions like when and where citizens feel at home, and what signifies their idea of a collective identity, again without prescribing the answers beforehand. It does not reject the emotionalization of the debate, as it recognizes the importance of emotions such as belonging and feeling at home for all citizens, whatever their ethnic and migration backgrounds.

### **Culturalization in Practice**

We measured the understanding of two crucial concepts in this field, assessing in ten focus groups:

What (implicit) notions of functional culturalization citizens have if they relate to cultural practices, norms, and values in a more constructivist or a more restorative manner.

What (implicit) notions of emotive culturalization citizens have if they relate to issues of identity, belonging, and loyalty in a more constructivist or a more restorative manner.

Apart from the set of questions on cultural practices and on loyalty and belonging, we also presented a broader set of daily life conflicts and dilemmas, of which we reported elsewhere in a study of civic engagement in a more general sense.<sup>33</sup> Here we frame the results in a new way, adding to the understanding of culturalization of citizenship.

Focus groups are not common in social science. However, this method has clear advantages in this particular area, as the discussions are among equals, and focus groups allow participants to use their own language, rather than react to an interviewer.<sup>34</sup> “Focus groups have a unique niche for obtaining information as tension between groups begins to rise. Surveys and other ways of obtaining information may be ineffective because neither party trust the other’s intentions.”<sup>35</sup> Hence, the method allows participants to feel relatively safe debating identity matters, which might be considered dangerous when talked about in the public sphere. However, rather than produce clear and supposedly unambiguous answers, focus groups help to understand schemata citizens use or develop to make sense of interactions that may or may not require a reaction. It is less the degree of the problem of polarization than the character of the problem of polarization that becomes visible.

The focus groups consisted of between five and ten participants in two cities in the Netherlands: Amsterdam and Arnhem, a smaller city in the east. Six of the groups consisted of active citizens taking part in civil organizations and were randomly chosen from a larger pool of citizen initiatives used for previous research.<sup>36</sup> In two groups, (migrant) participants’ religious (mainly Muslim) background was central in their civic engagement; in two groups, (migrant) participants had an explicit nonreligious background; and in two (native Dutch)

groups, backgrounds were mixed. Two groups consisted of individuals who were randomly selected on the streets, with a criterion that they were not a member of any organization at all. Two groups consisted of policy makers, that is, of people who were professionally involved in promoting active citizenship on the local level. The focus group transcripts of up to thirty-five pages were analyzed in three complementary ways: we looked at the debates by group, by question, and according to selected themes.

### **Functional Culturalization**

As to functional culturalization, we found both restorative and constructivist ways of arguing. Two topics in particular made these differences clear: a discussion on public holidays and one on alcohol at social gatherings at work. As to the public holidays, the focus groups discussed an imagined proposal of the central government to raise the Islamic end of Ramadan, Sugar feast, to the status of a national holiday, at the cost of one of the Christian holidays, like the second day of Easter or Pentecost (both public holidays in the Netherlands). This suggestion evoked restorative reactions in most native Dutch participants:

“I do not object to people celebrating it as such. I do object to the obligation to give one of my public holidays away.”

“They should keep their hands off my public holidays!”

It is not that the respondents have something particular to do on Christian public holidays; it is that these days are considered part and parcel of their culture and therefore cannot be done away with without putting their culture itself down the drain. Some respondents also expressed the fear of a slippery slope: if this would be given to the Muslims, the next day the Chinese would demand the same, and then the Buddhists.

This leaves the migrants very little room to support the imagined government’s proposal. They indeed do not; instead, they privatize the issue. To celebrate Sugar Feast is a

private issue, they argue: people have to have the possibility to do so, so the employer should allow them to have their day off then, but that is enough. Since they all get permission for a day off, they do not want to demand more. The issue, they fear, can only invoke negative reactions among the native Dutch about Muslims. We do not want to have trouble, so let us try to evade it by keeping it a private issue, they argue.

Yet some citizens deliberate in a more constructivist way about this issue. They consider an equal distribution of public holidays as a political issue. Considering the present composition of the population, changing one of the Christian holidays for the Sugar Feast seems no more than fair:

“As if there is a single soul walking around who still knows what happened at Pentecost.”

“But let’s keep it simple. What does the average Dutch citizen know about the public holidays? The meaning of Christmas?”

“So what is the fuss, what do we get rid of?”

“Nothing!”

Culture is made by those who participate in it, is the argument here. The goal of fair distribution is not simply one of money, jobs, power, and so forth, but also of symbols. Exchange of public holidays is a way to obtain a more fair distribution of symbols. If there are many Muslims in the Netherlands, Sugar Feast may become part of the Dutch culture. They make this argumentation easier for themselves by diminishing the meaning of Christian holidays, even Christmas. It should be added that most of the citizens who argue in this manner are policy makers for whom these kinds of issues are part of their everyday work. It may in that sense also signal a distance between ordinary citizens and policy makers: the first argue in a restorative manner, the second in a more constructivist way.

That same gap also seems to be present in the other issue: informal drinking with colleagues at the end of the week, in the last working hours of the day —a common practice

in the Netherlands. The issue we presented to the focus groups was that during these informal gatherings, alcohol is served; as a consequence, some Muslim colleagues never attend. Do you do something about this? Here again, many migrants but also native Dutch, argued that this was a private issue. If some people decided not to attend, that was their private choice. And if others decided to drink, or to turn up and not drink—all this was a private issue.

Nobody turned to the issue of culture to explain their opinions. Rather the opposite happened: most Muslims argued that they felt stigmatized by the suggestion that they would not turn up because of the presence of alcohol; they may not attend, but they would have their own reasons for that, and these may very well be that they wanted “to pick up their children from school.”

“It would make me really pissed off if my colleagues would presume in advance that I am not present because alcohol is being served. [Interviewer: “And if they ask if that is the case, would that make you angry too?”] Yes, just like “The Dutch take potatoes with them on holidays,” that sort of presupposition makes no sense at all. I am not present at the informal drinks, because I have a private life and if I am finished with my job, I have other things to do.”

After some time, the interviewers suggested solutions like alternating alcohol and tea with cake, but the respondents rejected these. By turning the whole thing into a private issue, on the one hand, they de-culturalized it but, on the other hand, made it impossible for themselves to find a way to deal with it collectively; even discussing it was already too problematic because of the fear of stigmatization.

Again, the focus groups with policy makers reacted in a completely different, constructivist manner. Would they do something about it? Yes, immediately! Even without the interviewer’s suggestion, they came up with all kinds of ideas of changing the tradition in order to integrate Muslims who do not want to be present where people are drinking. They

did not spend much time on the issue the other groups discussed at length: whether “real” Muslims reject the presence of people drinking. The first thing they would do is discuss this, in order to know what moved the people involved:

“I would at least want to be sure that that is the reason they do not turn up, because it does of course not have to be. . . . So I would like to know if that is the real cause, are people drinking too much, is the situation becoming unpleasant?”

“I think you are prejudiced if you presume it was the alcohol. So I would ask somebody who wasn’t there: ‘It was really great fun, why were you not present?’ . . . And if somebody would say that the alcohol was the reason, I would ask whether he wanted to be there altogether and ask what we could do to find a solution collectively. The solution could vary, like one time alcohol and the other time not, or the hour no alcohol.”

In this way, the discussion tended to move smoothly from dialogue to possible solutions, like alternating alcohol with ice cream or tea and cakes, or not allowing alcohol during the first part of the gathering.

Hence, policy makers fervently believed in constructivist culturalization: culture does matter, but the way it matters varies for different people and in different situations. Therefore, one first has to discuss motives and feelings, and from there one has to find practical solutions, and in that sense invent a new mixed microculture, a culture that was not there before and in which the backgrounds of all people involved are taken into account. The result is something new for all of them.

As this difference between restorative and constructivist virtually coincided with that between ordinary citizens and policy makers, two preliminary conclusions may be drawn about the difference between these two styles of culturalization: the constructivist demands the competence to discuss differences, like asking questions about other people’s motives and experiences in a nonaggressive manner, for example. The constructivist style also demands

power or at least the belief to have the power to define a situation. This might explain why many rather powerless migrants did not want to discuss the issues at all, fearing to become the object of stereotypes, while many rather powerless native Dutch, in the Sugar Feast issue, feared that other things may be stolen as well, like by Chinese or Buddhists demanding public holidays.

### **Emotive Culturalization**

As to emotive culturalization, regarding issues like loyalty, belonging, and identification, the differences between restorative and constructive coincide with another divide: that between migrants and native Dutch. Asked with what geographical part discussants identify as citizens, native-born Dutch would argue in a restorative manner, particularly concerning the national (and somewhat less the regional) scale. They do not hesitate a second to say they feel Dutch, or maybe “Twents” or “Achterhoeks” (Dutch regions), or a combination of these:

“Well, I feel more Dutch than Arnhems. I come from the countryside and I’m happy to go back there, but to feel comfortable I also have to be at least twenty-four hours a month in Amsterdam. I’ve got a beautiful house, a very sociable neighborhood. . . .But I don’t feel any bond with Arnhem.”

“I moved thirty times in my life. I lived in the west, in the east, over sea, but I am just Dutch, I don’t feel any, I mean, I like as well to be in Maastricht, and Amsterdam is of course lovely, but I do not feel something special for the city.”

However, it turns out to be difficult for the native Dutch to articulate in a concrete fashion what they mean, the national and/or regional identity they value so much. They treat Dutchness in a self-evident manner and scarcely relate it to individual experiences. They argue along general and vague lines, reflecting abstractions known from popular history rather than personal experience. If prompted to define the content of national identity, they do



so mostly in terms of what is lost, what the Netherlands or what the Dutch used to be like. Definitions of what the national level exactly is are often framed in emotional, nostalgic terms: what defines the Netherlands are things that have gone missing. Both citizens who throughout the discussion would see immigration as problematic and citizens who consistently tried to argue in favor of what they see as “the multicultural society” react in the same fashion. Tolerance, respect, liberty— classical Dutch values—were once the core of the national identity, but nowadays they are seen as very hard to connect to. They are perceived as gone or diminished, either due to loss of homogeneity or due to fear for this loss. Recent research in the United Kingdom also showed that the theme of national identity inspires sentiments of nostalgia rather than ambition or hope in native citizens.<sup>37</sup>

So the imagined community appears to be based more on history lessons or on public claims of politicians about the character of the Netherlands than on events or feelings respondents could claim as their own. To be sure, the debate on identification has a very public character. Respondents were all to a certain degree aware of the ongoing discussions in the media on the “suspicious loyalty” of double passports carrying cabinet ministers and “cosmopolite royalty.” But this debate as such seems to feed more than resolve the nostalgic character of national identification: invoking whatever idea of the Netherlands invariably means invoking the past, not the future. Loyalty among the native Dutch has an obvious and nostalgic character at the same time.

The native Dutch express intense feelings of warmth or sometimes anger, but these were void of individual experiences other than listening to the national anthem preceding soccer matches or other national sports events. These feelings of national identification occur sometimes at a distance—on holiday or when one talks to friends from another country.

In short, national identification among native Dutch is strong and of a restorative character: it has to do with something already present but vague and nostalgic. It is something

that is theirs, no doubt, but hard to grasp, and hardly or not related to concrete, everyday experiences. It is something to dig up and polish, not something to tinker with.

This restorative notion of national identity excludes migrants, particularly because it is hardly related to everyday events or experiences in which they could join. It is therefore not surprising that migrants do not claim to feel Dutch: they do not have the power to define it themselves, and the way it was defined by the native Dutch does not invite them to join in. So the national scale in general met with a shrug among migrants. Respondents would not come up spontaneously with strong emotions attached to the Netherlands. The interviewees would shy away from the subject.

“Why feel Dutch? You can connect to many nations.”

“You are automatically attached to the country where you are born, where you live and where your spouse comes from.”

Of course, everyone mentioned that he or she had some connection to the Netherlands, but during the discussions there appeared to be a strong reservation to stress this connection. It is only in comparison to the relative easiness with which attachment to the local level was debated that this can be explained.

Respondents with a migrant background found it hard to connect events in their daily lives to the Netherlands. It was, in other words, hard for them to develop emotional bonds with the national scale. The country in that sense is an entity that has relatively little meaning to them since they do not travel much in the country, their social and economic needs are fulfilled at other levels, and they experience little connection to national public debates. Immigrants from former colonies did mention the royal family as a connection to the nation, but this found little echo among younger and Muslim immigrants. Above of that, the thinness of the connection can be striking, as in the next example.

We heard a lot about the Netherlands, also at home from our grandfather and grandmother, about Queen Wilhelmina and the princess. At our school, money was raised for the marriage of Princess Beatrix. So we have always been connected with the Netherlands, but when people ask me what do you feel, I feel Hindustani, a Surinamese from Hindustani descent. It depends who asks and where.

However, we also asked the participants in the focus groups about local identification. That presented a completely different and almost reverse picture.

To city identities like “Amsterdammer” or “Arnhemmer,” the native Dutch attached less meaning, or if they do, it would repeatedly be a more or less negative one. As a middle-age native Dutch man said:

I feel Arnhemmer, I have been born there and lived their the larger part of my life and I do live there with pleasure, but this has nothing to do with the Arnhemmers, . . . because Arnhem is a troublesome, difficult city. I agree with the [previous participants who mentioned] surliness, the resigned character of the Arnhemmers. They are little curious to new things . . . which goes for me as well, by the way, but it is easier talking about others. However, it [Arnhem] is not something I’m proud of in that sense of the word.

Even when one still lives in the city where one is born, native Dutch see the local level as far less emotionally meaningful than the national level. Association with the city is obvious, or coincidental, compared to the country one lives in. Many native Dutch like the place where they actually live, but they assign more a functional than an emotional value to it. In comparison to the feelings the Netherlands gives them, Amsterdam or Arnhem has the meaning to provide a comfortable life. The city is seen as important in relating to work, shopping, or neighbors, not, or less, in relating to cocitizens.

Moreover, when debating the reasons why their identification with the city was less strong than with the nation, invariably experiences of loss would be recounted among the respondents of the native Dutch groups. Consider the argumentation of this elderly woman:

In Amsterdam I no longer feel at home, take the developments in the center and all attention to the city, politically, for the large economic interests and for yuppies in the city center and just for big companies. And socially everything is retarded. And when I'm in Bos and Lommer, that's where I live, just like my neighbor here [points at respondent next to her] well, I think, in the Kolenkitbuurt, yeah, it's just 90 percent immigrants. A few percent white, and the rest is immigrants. Completely different than in Zuid.

Yes, maybe that has to do with the fact that I don't feel Amsterdammer. . . . When you live in an area with lots of immigrants, in my street there are still a lot of Dutch because you're in privately owned houses and that is a difference, rent or ownership, but as I pass the corner I see more immigrants than Dutch. . . . It is not to say that I don't feel at home, because I do, but I don't feel Amsterdammer.</EXT>

The city, these last respondents implicitly argue, is not theirs because has been "taken over" by immigrants. The country may still be theirs, but the city is not anymore. However, even though this is a reason for de-identification, the fact that the natives do not claim the city so much as theirs may create room for migrants to develop and express feelings of identification there.

Migrants indeed predominantly express local forms of attachment. They hardly have trouble feeling "Amsterdammer" or "Arnhemmer," regardless of the degree to which they are active in the public sphere. On the contrary, they tend to feel comfortable with it. They are sometimes outright proud of being inhabitants of the city.

At first sight, the functional character of this loyalty appeared to be stronger than the emotional character. Local institutions appeared to be of substantial importance as they kept occurring in the narratives about the degree to which the city was important. Encounters at work or at school, at welfare institutions, but also discrimination at the work place or at the doctors, would be mentioned as instances of belonging or not belonging to the city.

However, there is also a more emotional side to this local citizenship that has most often to do with the family. One belongs to the city because one's family lives there, because one's children are born there, and sometimes also because it was the first place where one was welcomed after having fled a country of origin. The new welcoming ceremonies were also perceived as real entries into the city. A letter or even a handshake of the mayor, alderman or alderwoman, or a regular public servant is repeatedly seen as the starting point of an unambiguous emotional connection. "The moments when you feel Arnhemmer are during events and activities that Arnhem has, and other cities don't, like the remembrance of the Battle for Arnhem, because the city is worldwide known for it. But during Queensday, for instance, which is countrywide you feel more like a Dutchman."

Moreover, the nostalgia as felt by the native Dutch is well noticed by migrants, and makes them cautious to develop let alone express identification with the national scale. The Netherlands as something that primarily has to do with everything "nonmigrant" creates wariness. Aspiring to adhere is in that perspective not the most logical of reactions, as this may invoke rejection ("Who are you to claim you are Dutch?").

This is not to say that national citizenship is a void construction for migrants: apart from institutions as the royal family and national holidays as Queensday—on which the entire country is turned into a flea market—popular television shows as Idols and sports events all generate a certain bond. Also, mastering the Dutch language is considered a logical step among all respondents (tautologically, to a degree, as the meetings were held in Dutch).

Rather, the issue of ethnic diversity contributes to a straightforward distinction from citizens' perspective between the two levels on which one can create citizenship. On the local level, migrants enter public life relatively easy. This emphasizes the national level as a dearly desired identifier of last resort, not necessarily because of the jingoistic character of the native Dutch, but because of the interplay of chauvinism and resentment of that chauvinism caused by immigration.

Decisive in the difference in loyalty appears to be the (lack of) positive experiences and direct contacts that confirm or legitimate membership of the national community. Hence, local ceremonies confirming the legal attainment of citizenship in city halls (as are recently introduced) were highly appreciated by those who participated, as they were considered "welcoming." Hence, calling for more national identity as such is probably meaningless or counterproductive.

In short, native Dutch exhibit restorative culturalization concerning the national state—for them, is it the most important scale to emotionally attach to—which leaves migrants very little room to join in. Yet native Dutch do not claim the local level to the same degree, and probably not coincidentally, this is where migrants, necessarily in a more constructivist manner, develop feelings of attachment and loyalty.

### **Conclusion: How to Get Beyond Polarization?**

How can we understand the current polarization of the immigration and integration debate in the Netherlands? We started off by showing that the actual setting of the current polarization in the Netherlands is not that of several ethnic groups more or less mobilized against one another due to decades of multicultural policies. A more correct picture is that of a sizable moral majority arguing in rather closed, restorative terms of culture. This closed conception

of culture is shared by the more orthodox immigrants, even though their idea of the contents of a good culture is very different.

Next we argued that this process of culturalization of citizenship can help us to understand what is actually happening. We distinguished four types of culturalization on the basis of two axes: restorative versus constructivist, and functional versus emotive. In our empirical data we could show how these four operate.

As to emotive culturalization, some form of loyalty is expressed by all citizens we talked with, but the direction and scale of loyalty differed greatly between migrants and natives. The nation has a strong though vague meaning for the native Dutch, much stronger than their hometown. It invokes nostalgia. Native Dutch miss either the tolerance they were used to or tolerance as such. Either way, stressing the nation excludes immigrants more than it includes them. In this sense, the nation becomes a “political claim” more than an imagined community.<sup>38</sup> Immigrants are aware of this nostalgia. This already cautions them not to claim the nation as theirs. Moreover, they also lack concrete experience to claim the nation for themselves. This puts them in a double bind: they have to prove feelings of loyalty and belonging while at the same time being mistrusted and running the risk of rejection if they do.

When it comes to functional culturalization, we found native Dutch stress restorative culturalization concerning the issue of exchanging a Christian public holiday for the Islamic Sugar Feast, with migrants finding refuge in privatisation of the issue. In the case of drinking alcohol at social gatherings at work during working hours, the demarcation line was between policy makers and ordinary citizens, with policy makers stressing constructivist culturalization, while ordinary citizens turned it into a private issue.

Our research shows that neither of these four forms of culturalization can be understood without invoking the notion of power and competence. Obviously, this implies that they cannot be promoted successfully when issues of power and competence are not

taken into account. When it comes to functional culturalization, a constructivist approach is much more promising to combat polarization. But such an approach demands certain competencies, such as discussing issues in an open, inoffensive manner. Moreover, it demands the feeling of power to some degree, necessary to take the risk to make some room for others without the fear that everything may be taken from you at a glimpse when you do. Policy makers possess these competencies and feelings of power more than ordinary citizens, which may explain why the former show the constructivist approach more often than the latter.

When it comes to emotional culturalization, power is very much at stake, too, but the demarcation line between groups here lies more between migrants and native citizens. Native Dutch have the power to identify where and how they want, and even to claim something as theirs, without a real say about it and with very little experience with it. It is both attractive and possible for them to argue in a restorative manner, thereby excluding migrants from national identification. Migrants notice this all too well and do not dare to claim the nation as theirs. They do, however, identify with the city in a constructivist manner, simply because neither the nation nor the restorative way is accessible to them when it comes to emotive culturalization. The only restorative emotive culturalization that is accessible to them is to relate to their own culture and country of origin. Here we can see polarization in a painfully pure form: when natives find refuge in a restorative emotive culturalization, migrants can either react humbly by trying the constructivist approach at the local level (where they also need natives to join them and recognize their right to do so) or they take the more easy way of restorative emotional culturalization—but they can only do so by taking refuge in the culture (and/or religion) of their origin.

What does all that mean for combating polarization? First, it is necessary to promote constructivist culturalization, both at the local and the national levels. In other words, it is



necessary to open up the nation for migrants as an area for emotional identification. The actual identification of immigrants with their hometowns hints at the possibilities of extending meaningful experiences rather than restorative exercises such as the focus on a historical canon. Or when such a canon is invoked, this should also be done in a constructivist manner, by relating it to issues and citizens of today. But also events such as national and local welcoming ceremonies should be promoted, provided they also have a constructivist character.

Second, migrants should be supported in their efforts in local (constructivist) culturalization, by promoting local participation together with native Dutch and other groups, in order to facilitate the process of constructing culture together.

Third, all citizens need competencies to deal with differences in a constructivist manner. Therefore, the empowerment of both native and migrant Dutch citizens is at stake: only if they master their own lives will they have the courage to use these competencies.

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